Shaquill Griffin’s been a quality player for the Seattle Seahawks over the last three seasons, with his best season coming most recently in 2019. Griffin was tied for 15th in the league last year with 13 passes defensed, and over the last three years, is 13th in the league in total passes defensed at 36. Griffin is fourth among corners in his class in ball production, behind only Marshon Lattimore (44), Tre’Davious White (43), and Marlon Humphrey (40), despite being drafted 70 picks behind the lot of them. This is significant.
Griffin wasn’t a perfect prospect and had some scheme specificity to him, but the Seahawks saw his length, long speed, and linear explosiveness and knew he was a fit for their preferred style of coverage: aggressive, in-your-face corners who can stay on top of vertical route stems. Griffin is a testimony to knowing your system and finding players who fit in it. The Seahawks have famously never drafted a Round 1 corner under general manager John Schneider—but with picks like Griffin, and even running mate fifth-round safety convert Tre Flowers, why would you?
There is, however, a black mark on Griffin’s otherwise sterling record: his interception numbers. Griffin’s three interceptions are significantly below that of Lattimore (8), White (12), and Humphrey (7) over the last three seasons. In fact, Griffin has not hauled in an interception since his two-INT game against the Chicago Bears in Week 2 of 2018. That’s 1,680 snaps on defense without an interception—a stunning amount, especially when you consider his 18 passes defensed over the same span. Among defensive backs with at least 36 in the last three seasons, Griffin’s three INTs stand alone as the lowest number.
Do interceptions matter? It’s a dumb question—of course they do—but it is worth taking this evaluation of Griffin’s career thus far with a grain of salt. At the team defense level, interceptions are a high-variance stat. As Josh Hermsmeyer of FiveThirtyEight showed, only 2.4% of future year interception performance was predicted by past year interception performance—only fumbles were a higher-variance stat among defensive metrics. At the individual level, we can reasonably expect the same to be true: that interceptions are highly situational stats, that include some level of individual talent, but greater levels of dumb luck. Remember, no defensive back has led the league in interceptions in consecutive seasons since Everson Walls in 1981-1982.
So should Griffin’s poor interception performance matter? Arguably, no. He’s going to regress upward and bring in more picks. By virtue of the company he’s in by the snaps he takes, coverage responsibilities he fills, targets he sees, and passes he breaks up, it is reasonable to expect him to get luckier with errant throws and batted balls, turning more PBUs into INTs. Even if he continues playing the exact same way, he’ll bring in more picks than he has to this point.
But interceptions do matter within the context of a drive and a game. In 2019, the average EPA for a defense on an interception was more than four times that of an incompletion (again from Hermsmeyer) and was more than twice as valuable as a sack. Without knowing the outcome of a fumble (return for a touchdown) or a sack (safety), the absolute best play a defense can generate on any given down is an interception.
https://twitter.com/friscojosh/status/1217604666231361536
Griffin’s been a great cover man for Seattle, but he simply would have helped his team more over the last few years if he turned some of those pass breakups into picks. But again, Griffin doesn’t seem particularly deficient in skill here. Through Griffin’s PBUs over the last few years, there has been a dropped interception or two, but he doesn’t have any worse ball security in the air than most corners do.
https://youtu.be/My1mLo4HaZM
There are, however, several PBUs that stand out as positive plays because no corner would have been able to intercept the pass, and many corners would not have been able to affect the catch point.
https://youtu.be/IRMvz5okRaI
Griffin is not what we’d describe as a sticky corner. Griffin does not have mirror-match quickness, as he’s a bit too upright and leggy in his transitions and strides. He also doesn’t play with a traditional man-coverage technique—the backpedal—that would ensure his shoulders were facing the football when he was closing into a route, making it easier for him to secure a catch. Rather, Griffin is a recovery player, with the desirable explosiveness, physicality, and length to launch himself into and through the catch point from disadvantageous positioning. He is a target-denying sort of corner (17th in the league in targets/snap, per PFF), who looks to cancel routes with his size and technique at the line of scrimmage instead of inviting targets with sneaky off coverage in the hope of making a play on the football.
When you look at some of the most prolific interceptors of the modern passing game, like Asante Samuel, Champ Bailey, and Ronde Barber, Samuel was an elite baiter of throws; Barber was impossibly quick; Bailey had both traits in spades. Griffin neither plays a style of coverage nor has a physical skill set that lends itself to high interception totals. That’s not to say it’s impossible—Richard Sherman had 20 picks in his first three seasons in Seattle while playing a decently similar role to Griffin—but it’s certainly harder.
Like many aspects of the Seattle coaching philosophy, this is the bed they’ve made, and now they might just have to lie in it. Unlike White and Lattimore and Humphrey, who have delivered on their Round 1 billing and are cost-controlled for two more years on their respective franchises, Griffin is approaching a contract year. With the cornerback market warming up for a earth-shattering boom in the next two offseasons, there have been calls for Griffin to be extended early by Seattle, in an attempt to beat the market.
This would be a wise move, and a good deal for Griffin (a four-year, $52M dollar deal would put him just at the border of a top-10 paycheck among cornerbacks) wouldn’t nearly break the bank. In just two offseasons, that deal could be closer to 20 than it would be to 10. But the best thing a cornerback can do for you is to pick the ball off, and for some unmeasurable amalgamation of luck, skill, and scheme, Griffin just hasn’t picked the ball off enough yet.
The instinct to wait, watch another season, and make a decision doesn’t necessarily solve your problem. Griffin could very well regress positively, as we’d expect—now you’re paying more money for essentially the same player, who just got lucky at the right time. Griffin could very well see his play deteriorate overall, thus keeping his interception numbers down—but you’re likely still going to pay him, knowing what he can be. And the most likely outcome? He continues to be a strong CB1 candidate, maybe even tracking receivers across the formation, while his interception numbers stay modest. And you’re still wearing the same boots; the mud’s just a little bit deeper now.
The Seahawks should extend Griffin, who is a CB1 and a snug scheme fit, as every passing day makes the price tag more likely to rise without the benefit of new information. Griffin’s a good player, and while his interception output is far from ideal, it’s also difficult to fully grasp what the problem is. Here, riding on the magic of positive regression seems the prudent choice.
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